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MERRIL SOBIE is a law professor at Pace Law School in White Plains, 
New York, where he specializes in family and children’s law. JOHN D. 
“JAY” ELLIOTT is an attorney in private practice in Columbia, South 
Carolina, where he has represented children and their parents for over 
30 years.
In 1980, the American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated a far-reaching comprehensive body of Juvenile Justice Stan-dards, thereby providing a blueprint for the reform of a system 
that had serious deficiencies. Developed in partnership with the 
Institute of Judicial Administration (IJA) at New York Univer-
sity, the standards address the entire juvenile justice continuum, 
from police handling and intake to adjudication, disposition, 
juvenile corrections, and ancillary functions. Approximately 
300 professionals collaborated for a decade to produce the 23 
volumes approved by the ABA House of Delegates.
To this day, the standards remain relevant and reformist. 
Several have been implemented in whole or in part. However, 
since institutional resistance has compromised the meaningful 
consideration of the standards as a whole, the ABA must redou-
ble its efforts to promote their acceptance and implementation.
This article looks at the history of the standards’ development 
and implementation, and delineates the need for updating several 
provisions and the urgent need to advocate for their application.
In the Beginning
In 1971, the IJA concluded its path-breaking work as the sec-
retariat for the completion and approval of the ABA Criminal 
Justice Standards. It was thought, quite naturally, that a com-
panion volume should address the juvenile justice system. 
One volume ultimately grew to 23, as the principal leaders 
discovered that juvenile justice and delinquency presented 
a disparate picture of practices and procedures around the 
country. A comprehensive solution was needed.
In 1973, the ABA became a cosponsor of the project, 
which became known as the IJA-ABA Joint Commission on 
Juvenile Justice Standards. Six years later, in 1979, the mul-
tivolume set of standards was submitted to the ABA House 
of Delegates at its Midyear Meeting. The House of Dele-
gates approved 17 volumes at that meeting, and three more 
in 1980. Three standards were not approved by the ABA. 
The standards regarding noncriminal misbehavior, or sta-
tus offenses, were tabled due to opposition to their primary 
goal, eliminating court jurisdiction over such offenses. The 
volume governing schools and education was withdrawn 
from consideration, and the standards on abuse and neglect 
were revised but never resubmitted for ABA approval. (For 
more background, see How It Began: A Brief History of the 
Standards, page 27.)
The IJA-ABA Juvenile 
Why Full Implementation Is Long Overdue
BY MERRIL SOBIE AND JOHN D. ELLIOTT
Justice Standards
C R I M I N A L  J U S T I C E  n  F a l l  2 0 1 4  2 5
Resistance and Inertia
As the standards moved toward adoption by the ABA House 
of Delegates, their principal organizer and director, Barbara 
Flicker, envisioned a meaningful launch for national accep-
tance. In her Summary and Analysis of the standards, she 
recommended a plan of implementation similar to that of the 
ABA Criminal Justice Standards:
1. preparation of a state-by-state analysis comparing the 
standards with laws, statutes, and rules in the various 
jurisdictions;
2. appointment of an implementation task force of key 
leaders in each state;
3. goal-setting and strategic development to coordinate 
discussion of the standards with all components of the 
criminal justice system; and
4. education of practitioners and the public about the 
standards.
(BArBArA dAnzIger flICker, stAndArds for JuvenIle Jus-
tICe: A summAry And AnAlysIs 261–62 (1977).)
Calling for a “massive drive” by the ABA to educate and 
recruit advocates for the adoption of the standards, supported 
with funding from foundations, nonprofits, and reform groups, 
Flicker warned against the inertia of gradualism. The goal 
was to avoid piecemeal adoption of discrete standards and 
gain acceptance of the standards to overhaul the fragmented 
juvenile justice system.
By 1980, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(OJJDP) had invested significant sums of money in the 
development of standards and guidelines to improve the func-
tioning of the juvenile justice system. These included the 
IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards, the National Advisory 
Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Standards for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, and those 
developed by the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention of the National Advisory Committee on 
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. OJJDP also helped 
fund the development of juvenile corrections standards by 
the American Correctional Association.
On June 16, 1982, OJJDP announced a solicitation for a 
demonstration program to further disseminate and implement 
the standards. Entitled the National Juvenile Justice Standards 
Resource and Demonstration Program, its objectives included 
demonstration projects in six jurisdictions to test revision of 
laws, court rules or policies reflecting the array of standards, 
resource materials to assist in the consideration or adoption 
of standards, and training.
Within a month, however, OJJDP abruptly cancelled the solic-
itation at the direction of the newly constituted National Advisory 
Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 
The committee was asked to reconsider, but refused. Ultimately 
directed by the Appropriations Committee of the United States 
House of Representatives to continue the standards demonstra-
tion project as originally proposed, the edict was ignored.
The abrupt withdrawal of federal support meant that 
standards efforts supported by the DOJ—those of the National 
Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention and the National Advisory Committee on Crim-
inal Justice Standards and Goals—were effectively a dead 
letter. The ABA was left to support and circulate the IJA-ABA 
Juvenile Justice Standards on its own, which it did.
It did so, though, in the face of increasingly punitive poli-
cies directed at the problem of violent juvenile crime, as much 
the subject of political hyperbole as concrete fact. With alarms 
raised about the specter of juvenile “super-predators” during 
the 1990s, many jurisdictions enacted legislation transferring 
juvenile offenders to the adult criminal courts. Ironically, it 
may be said that as the juvenile courts labored politically to 
cling tenaciously to sanction runaways and truants, they ceded 
responsibility for juveniles accused of serious offenses to the 
adult criminal justice system.
In the mid-1990s, the Criminal Justice Section attempted a 
revival of its juvenile justice standards initiative. (Robert E. 
Shepherd Jr., ABA Juvenile Justice Standards: Anchor in the 
Storm, CrIm. Just., Winter 1996, at 39.) Its ability to do so, 
however, was hamstrung by a limited budget and the politi-
cal headwinds then prevailing.
Hence, the inertia and gradualism that Flicker warned 
against affected the standards in the two decades after their 
adoption. By 1975, she noted in her Summary and Analysis, 
the ABA Criminal Justice Standards had been cited a total 
of 3,664 times in appellate decisions around the country. By 
comparison, the Juvenile Justice Standards, as of this writ-
ing, have been cited 60 times. That said, the Juvenile Justice 
Standards have in great measure proven successful. Although 
the project did not precipitate a juvenile justice “revolution,” 
the inherent validity of the standards have greatly contributed 
to the development of American juvenile justice.
Implementation
Although not the sweeping transformation of the system that 
reformers desired, the standards have been at least partially 
implemented, albeit on a more gradual and ad hoc basis than 
expected, influencing judicial decisions, legislation, admin-
istrative directives, and the enactment of state standards. 
Evolutionary acceptance has proceeded from the date of 
promulgation to the present. Although full implementation 
has not been achieved—and may never be achieved—the 
guidelines’ continuing utilization is a testament to their effi-
cacy and relevance. What follows are a few examples in the 
life of the Juvenile Justice Standards.
First, the standards have been applied and cited in scores 
of appellate cases. One recent example is the 2010 Alaska 
Court of Appeals decision of B.F.L. v. State, in which the 
court adopted the ABA Dispositional Standards:
To fill this [dispositional] legislative vacuum, this Court 
exercised its common-law power to announce a stan-
dard that would govern the superior court’s choice of 
disposition: We therefore recognize the standards pro-
mulgated by the IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards 
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Project, Standards Relating to Dispositions . . . . [T]he 
court must consider and reject less restrictive alterna-
tives prior to imposition of more restrictive alternatives. 
. . . The court must enter specific written findings why 
the less restrictive alternatives are inappropriate in a 
given case, and those findings must be supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence.
(233 P.3d 1118, 1123 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (citing R.P. 
v. State, 718 P.2d 168, 169 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).)
Similarly, in United States v. Juvenile, 347 F.3d 778 (9th 
Cir. 2003), the court reversed a disposition that had violated 
the dispositional standards. (See also In re Welfare of C.A.W., 
579 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that the 
IJA-ABA dispositional purpose standard had been “in identical 
form subsequently enacted by the Minnesota Legislature”).)
Several additional appellate decisions have been guided 
by the standards relating to waiver or transfer of a juvenile 
for adult criminal prosecution; see, for example, the Supreme 
Court of Iowa case of State v. Wright, 456 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 
1990), and the federal case of People of Territory of Guam 
v. Kingsbury, 649 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1981). The problematic 
issue of waiver of counsel by a child has been addressed by 
at least two appellate courts. Citing the standards, both deci-
sions severely restricted waiver and required that counsel be 
appointed and participate at a hearing to determine whether 
waiver would be appropriate (the prewaiver appointment and 
participation by counsel greatly limits, if not precludes, a deci-
sion to waiver). (State ex rel. J.M. v. Taylor, 276 S.E.2d 199 
(W. Va. 1981); In re T.R.B., 325 N.W.2d 329 (Wis. 1982).)
Last, courts have applied the standards in cases that did not 
involve juvenile justice. For example, the California Court 
of Appeals cited the standards in a tort case initiated by an 
emancipated minor. (Gore v. Stowe, 231 Cal. Rptr. 492 (Ct. 
App. 1986).) The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
quoted the Standards Relating to Private Parties in conclud-
ing that an indigent parent is constitutionally entitled to the 
appointment of counsel in a consent to adoption case. (Dep’t 
of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 406 (Mass. 1979).)
Over the course of the past 30 years, several specific stan-
dards have also influenced and encouraged the enactment of 
similar or identical state dispositional guidelines. For example, 
West Virginia has adopted state dispositional standards that 
replicate the IJA-ABA version. (See Facilities Review Panel 
v. Coe, 420 S.E.2d 532, 535–36 (W. Va. 1992).) The Minne-
sota legislature has enacted the dispositional purpose clause 
verbatim. (See In re Welfare of C.A.W., 579 N.W.2d 494, 
497 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).) Most recently, Illinois enacted 
legislation effective January, 2012, that allows juvenile court 
judges to commit juveniles to confinement at disposition only 
after efforts were made to locate less restrictive alternatives 
and state reasons why those efforts were unsuccessful. (See, 
Lisa Jacobs and Betsy Clark, Impact of Illinois’ Statutory 
Change Mandating the Least Restrictive Alternative Stan-
dard, models for ChAnge meAsureABle Progress serIes 
(2014), assessing the impact of the legislation.)
At a wider level, the standards have directly and indirectly 
encouraged the promulgation of comprehensive juvenile 
justice state standards to guide counsel and structure court 
proceedings. For example, the New York State Bar Asso-
ciation has approved a series of standards for representing 
children in a wide range of cases, including juvenile delin-
quency, status offenses, child protective, and child support. 
(See NYSBA Comm. on Children and the Law, Standards for 
Attorneys Representing Children (2011), available at http://
tinyurl.com/kojlyrq.) The New York standards were developed 
in the late twentieth century and have been revised and updated 
through several editions, and further revisions are pending. 
Although the New York standards do not completely follow 
the IJA-ABA version, most of the important ABA-suggested 
doctrines are largely incorporated, such as the role of counsel, 
the “least restrictive” dispositional rule, and the participation 
of the child’s parents. Several other states have also promul-
gated standards that closely resemble the IJA-ABA model.
Perhaps the most significant legislative development 
reflecting the IJA-ABA standards has been the right to coun-
sel. New York effectively prohibited waiver in 1978. (n.y. 
fAm. Ct. ACt § 249-a.) Although theoretically permitting 
waiver, the section’s strictures have effectively prohibited 
the practice; since 1978, there has been no reported case in 
which waiver has been permitted. Several states, including 
Minnesota and, more recently, Pennsylvania, have prohibited 
waiver of counsel, while other states have severely limited the 
practice. Tellingly, a national survey found that of 99 appeals 
of waiver, the vast majority resulted in reversals. (See Mary 
Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver 
in the Juvenile Courts, 54 flA. l. rev. 577 (2002).)
The role of counsel is another related issue that has evolved 
toward the ABA model. In 1979, the now-discredited “guard-
ian ad litem” principles, whereby counsel advocates his or her 
perceived view of the child’s best interests, prevailed through-
out the country. Today, the prevailing model is far more akin 
to the traditional client-driven representation paradigm (See 
JuvenIle JustICe stAndArds: stAndArds relAtIng to Counsel 
for PrIvAte PArtIes § 3.1.) The New York standards, for exam-
ple, reflecting a court rule applicable to the representation of 
children in every family court case, stipulates that “the child’s 
attorney should maintain a traditional attorney-client relation-
ship and zealously defend the child . . . there is a presumption 
that the [child’s] attorney will abide by a client’s decision 
concerning the objectives of representation.” (See n.y. rules 
of the ChIef Judge, 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7.2.) Although not uni-
versally accepted, particularly in child protective cases, the 
contemporary paradigm is far closer to the attorney-client 
relationship established by the IJA-ABA standards.
A parallel development has been the tentative movement 
away from massive, largely rural custodial facilities for 
delinquent youths to small, nonsecure community-based pro-
grams. (See, e.g., n.y. fAm. Ct. ACt § 353.3 (implementing 
the “close to home” initiative, whereby nonsecure place-
ments of juveniles adjudicated delinquent in New York City 
must be within the metropolitan area).) Several states have 
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implemented programs to reinvest dollars saved by limiting 
the use of large juvenile institutions to enhance commu-
nity-based options, both nonresidential and residential. (See 
nAt’l JuvenIle JustICe network, BrIngIng youth home: A 
nAtIonAl movement to InCreAse PuBlIC sAfety, rehABIlItAte 
youth And sAve money (2011).) The movement represents a 
twenty-first century progressive change long advocated by the 
standards, especially those relating to corrections and archi-
tecture of facilities, quite controversial in their day.
In sum, although the hopes for immediate reform were not 
realized, the 30 years of post-standards history have seen a 
gradual evolution toward implementation (not infrequently 
a two-step advance followed by a one-step retreat). Much 
remains to be accomplished. The standards nevertheless serve 
as a contemporary beacon for the judiciary, state legislatures, 
and the American bar. Writing in 1996, Robert Shepherd Jr. 
observed, “The Standards today can still serve as that criti-
cal anchor for the juvenile justice system . . . . [T]he ultimate 
product is as valuable today as it was in 1979 and 1980 when 
the House of Delegates gave it its endorsement.” (Shepherd, 
Anchor in the Storm, supra, at 41.) Professor Shepherd’s con-
clusions are equally salient today.
The Need for Further Implementation
The standards have been widely cited over the course of 
several decades and, as noted, many have been gradually 
implemented by several jurisdictions. However, some impor-
tant standards have failed to gain traction; for those, the 2014 
landscape is virtually identical to that of 1980.
One significant example is the minimum age of juvenile 
delinquency responsibility. Section 2.1 of the Standards 
Relating to Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions stipulates 
an age range of “not less than ten and not more than sev-
enteen years.” No state exceeds the maximum age, and in 
recent years several have joined the overwhelming national 
consensus by raising the age to 17. However, 35 states have 
not established a minimum age (15 states have enacted mini-
mums ranging from ages six to 10). In fact, prosecution of 
the very young is prevalent. In 2011, approximately 45,000 
cases involving children younger than 12 years of age were 
referred for juvenile delinquency prosecution, and approxi-
mately 7,000 were adjudicated as delinquent. (See Nat’l Ctr. 
for Juvenile Justice, Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statis-
tics: 1985–2011, OJJDP, www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs 
(the survey does not differentiate by age below 12).) Pros-
ecuting the very young raises fundamental legal and moral 
issues, including competency (how many six- or 10-year-
olds understand judicial proceedings and can materially 
assist in their defense?), mens rea or specific intent, and 
diminished responsibility. The landmark twenty-first century 
brain development studies documented by the MacArthur 
Foundation (www.adjj.org), though focused on the older 
adolescents, may be of particular relevance to their younger 
“delinquent” colleagues and should encourage implementa-
tion of the long dormant standard. In fact, a strong argument 
can be advanced for raising the minimum age standard from 
age 10 to age 12.
A second example is appeals. The standards advocate a 
vibrant appellate process for every facet of the juvenile court 
system, necessary to regulate often unfettered discretion, correct 
errors, and develop precedent. Yet, as noted in a recent ABA 
Criminal Justice Section Report to the House of Delegates, 
the national rate of appeal for juvenile justice adjudications of 
guilt is dismal—five appeals per 1,000 juvenile delinquency 
convictions (the rate approaches zero percent in many states.) 
(See Megan Annitto, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, 66 u. mIAmI 
l. rev. 671 (2012).) Viewing the crucial area of the appellate 
process, the standards have had close to zero effect.
The above examples are illustrative; many additional stan-
dards, from among the voluminous whole, could be cited. 
Much work remains to be done.
Amending the Standards
The comprehensive body of standards has met the test of time 
remarkably well. Most are as relevant today as the day they 
were approved. Implementation has been gradual and spo-
radic, in fact painfully slow. Gradualism is a salient argument 
for reinvigoration, though, fortunately, the text as a whole 
does not need major revision.
The passage of three decades accompanied by the inevita-
ble intervening developments, however, has rendered several 
specific provisions or groups of standards outdated. One 
example is capacity. Section 3.5 of the Standards Relating to 
Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions stipulates in its entirety:
Juvenile delinquency liability should not be imposed 
if, at the time of the conduct charged to constitute the 
offense, as a result of mental disease or defect, the 
juvenile lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or 
her conduct to the requirements of the law.
The standard is identical to its criminal law counterpart, 
i.e., the rule applicable to adult criminal defendants. However, 
the seemingly revolutionary techniques of adolescent brain 
imaging and resultant biological studies recognized and incor-
porated in a growing number of court decisions, from the US 
Supreme Court to the local juvenile courts, have rendered the 
standard obsolete. We now know that the lack of capacity in 
many youths is not the “result of mental disease or defect,” 
but instead the result of normal but as yet incomplete brain 
development. The crucial scientific findings should form the 
basis of a revised standard (indeed, should be reflected in 
several standards).
The standards are also virtually silent concerning the col-
lateral consequences of a delinquency finding. Collateral 
consequences were mild in 1975, but have burgeoned to 
major importance. Similarly, the educational policy of “zero 
tolerance” did not exist, but is now prevalent. To cite one 
additional example, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, a 
path for immigrant children to achieve permanent residency 
and citizenship under federal law (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)
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(J)) has become a major issue in child protective, guard-
ianship, and delinquency litigation. The provision surely 
merits inclusion in the standards.
Several of the revisions outlined above would conform 
the standards to current ABA policies. In fact, one need 
only read ABA resolutions to draft contemporary standards 
concerning zero tolerance, collateral consequences, and 
appeals. Updating would maintain the standards’ currency 
and would underscore their twenty-first century relevance. 
It would be impractical, as well as unnecessary, to pro-
mulgate a complete second edition; what is needed is a 
continuing endeavor to maintain timeliness. It’s good to 
be able to say, as we have, that the standards have for the 
most part retained their importance and relevance. It would 
be better to say that the standards have been updated and 
maintained to fully address the contemporary juvenile jus-
tice world.
Conclusion
What is needed is a reinvigoration of the standards through 
enhanced dissemination and review, as well as a program to 
selectively update and augment several specific provisions. 
This is not a new idea—indeed it is overdue. In 1993, a work-
ing group empaneled by the ABA recommended just such a 
rejuvenation and updating of the standards. (A.L. Higginbo-
tham Jr., America’s Children at Risk: A National Agenda for 
Legal Action, 74 (1993).)
The standards should be widely disseminated to national 
legislative and judicial support organizations, such as the 
National Center for State Courts, the National Judicial College, 
and the National Conference of State Legislatures. Juvenile 
justice and advocacy organizations, especially legal advocacy 
organizations, should feature the standards and commentary on 
their websites, including, for example, the National Juvenile 
Defender Center, the National District Attorneys Association, 
and the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.
The standards should also be widely circulated to practitio-
ners, so that they may be cited and incorporated in their work. 
This would include public defender organizations, appellate 
public defense agencies, and law schools that maintain juve-
nile justice clinics or children’s law centers.
Finally, there should be a continuing ABA program to 
gradually update those standards that need revision and add 
new standards that address twenty-first century cutting edge 
issues and ABA policy, as has been done for the Criminal 
Justice Standards.
As Barbara Flicker observed in her Summary and Analy-
sis, the IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards are an invaluable 
asset “packed with treasures: studies, statistics, decisions, 
references, well-defined positions, and carefully reasoned 
justifications.” (Flicker, A Summary and Analysis, supra, at 
270.) They merit renewed attention by practitioners, decision 
makers, and policy makers. The standards light the path to 
affording children due process and dignity, while distinguish-
ing between minor and serious youthful misconduct. They are 
essential to protect the public, return confidence in the juve-
nile justice system, and afford our children a fair adjudication 
and rehabilitative environment. n
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